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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
CRIMINAL LAW: ACCUSATORY PLEADINGS AS DETERMINING NECESSARILY
INCLUDED OFFENSES
The California state constitution provides that no person shall twice be put
in jeopardy for the same offense.' Because a defendant on trial for a specified crime
may be convicted of any offense necessarily included in that crime,2 the legislature
extended the double jeopardy rule to prohibit a subsequent prosecution for an
offense necessarily included in a charge previously prosecuted. 3 Also, by judicial
determination it has been held that a conviction of a lesser offense, necessarily
included in a higher offense for which the defendant is tried, is an acquittal of the
higher offense.4 This extension made it necessary to develop a test to determine
what is a necessarily included offense.
The test currently utilized by the courts is that if a defendant in the commis-
sion of acts made unlawful by one statute must necessarily violate another statute,
the latter offense is necessarily included in the former.5 The courts in developing
this test did not clearly state where to look to determine whether a particular
offense was necessarily included in another within the meaning of section 1159 of
the Penal Code.6 Since the courts neglected this clarification, the question of
whether to look to the accusatory pleadings or to the statutory definitions was
bound to come before the Supreme Court of California for decision. This question
was presented in People v. MarshalP and the court held that they would look to
the specific language of the accusatory pleading, and not the statutory definition.
In this case the defendant pleaded not guilty to a charge alleging robbery in
violation of section 211 of the Penal Code which defines the crime as:
"[Tihe felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his
person or immediate presence, and against his will accomplished by means of force or
fear."
The information charged that the defendant did "willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and forcibly take from the person and immediate presence of Jack J. Martens...
seventy dollars ... and an automobile ... " The defendant was found guilty of
theft of an automobile, a violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code, a lesser
offense, but necessarily included within section 211 of the Penal Code. The defend-
ant appealed contending that section 503 of the Vehicle Code was not necessarily
included in the offense defined in section 211 of the Penal Code, since the elements
of the two offenses were different. The defendant said that one could commit rob-
bery without taking an automobile and that therefore charging the defendant with
1 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7. See also CAL. PEN. CODE § 657 for a narrower view than that of
the Constitution.
2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1159.
. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1023.
4 People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 184 P.2d 512 (1947) ; People v. McDaniels, 137 Cal. 192,
194, 69 Pac. 1006, 1007 (1902) ; People v. Defoor, 100 Cal. 150, 34 Pac. 642 (1893).
5 People v. Chester, 138 Cal. App. 2d 829, 292 P.2d 573 (1956) ; In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171,
288 P.2d 5 (1955) ; People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 229 P.2d 843 (1951) ; People v.
Kehoe, 33 Cal. 2d 711, 204 P.2d 321 (1949) ; People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 184 P.2d 512
(1947) ; People v. Krupa, 64 Cal. App. 2d 592, 598 149 P.2d 416, 420 (1944).
6 "The jury, or the judge if a jury trial is waived, may find the defendant guilty of any
offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged, or of
an attempt to commit the offense."
7 48 Cal. 2d 392, 309 P.2d 456 (1957).
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the "words of the statute"8 would not be charging the defendant with a violation
of section 503 of the Vehicle Code. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court on the ground that when examining the accusatory pleading, section
503 of the Vehicle Code was a lesser offense necessarily included in the crime spe-
cifically charged. Therefore, a conviction for violation of section 503 of theVehicle
Code could be upheld even though a violation of that statute did not come within
the statutory definition of the crime of robbery.
Since People v. Marshall was a first decision on the point of law involved, the
purpose of this note is to show that the reasoning of the court was sound and that
the case, therefore, presents an excellent solution to a heretofore legal dilemma.
The purpose of an accusatory pleading is to inform the defendant of the charge
which he must meet at the trial.9 The reason for this objective is to comply with
the due process of law requirement that an accused be advised of the charges
against him so that he may prepare and present his case and not be taken by sur-
prise by the evidence offered against him at his trial.10 The liberalizing of plead-
ing by the amendments to section 952 of the Penal Code in 1927 and 1929, n1 has
resulted in the declaration that the pleading is sufficient if it be worded in such a
manner as to give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused.
In People v. Dant12 the court held that an information (accusatory pleading)
that set out a particular description of the acts constituting the crime charged,
even though it did not charge the offense in the language of the statute, was suffi-
cient. In People v. Emmons13 the court held that the only correct way to determine
the sufficiency of an information is to compare the statement therein of the acts
committed by the defendant with the language of the statute alleged to have been
violated, in order to determine whether or not the defendant is charged with the
offense defined in the statute. The Marshall case is similar in that the information
and its allegations described the acts which were made a crime by section 503 of
the Vehicle Code without using the statutory definitions of the crime.
A misnomer or inaccurate designation of a crime in the caption or other part
of the complaint, indictment, or information will not vitiate it where there is suffi-
cient detailing of the facts constituting the offense in the body of the pleadings so
that the defendant is fully apprised of the nature of the charge against him. In such
a case the statement of the facts controls and the defendant stands charged with
the offense specifically alleged.14 The above statement of the law tends to support
the holding of People v. Marshall, that it is the specifically pleaded allegations and
not the statutory definition that is looked to to determine what is the offense
charged. The mere fact that the Marshall case happens to be discussing "neces-
sarily included offenses" should not remove the case from the theory that the
offense specifically alleged is controlling in determining the crimes charged.
8 An accusatory pleading in such general terms is expressly permitted under CAL. Pmr.
CODE § 952.
9 People v. Codina, 30 Cal. 2d 356, 359, 181 P.2d 881, 883 (1947); People v. Brac, 73
,Cal.App.2d 629, 634, 635, 167 P.2d 535, 537 (1946); People v. Yant, 26 Cal.App.2d 725, 730,
80 P.2d 506, 508 (1938).
10 In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171, 288 P.2d 5 (1955).
11 CAL. STATS. 1927, p. 1043 and STATS. 1929, p. 303.
12 68 Cal. App. 588, 590, 229 Pac. 983, 984 (1924).
13 13 Cal.App. 487, 491, 110-Pac. 151, 152 (1910).
14 People v. Izlar, 8 Cal. App. 600, 97 Pac. 985 (1908) ; People v. Morely, 8 Cal. App. 372,
97 Pac. 84 (1908) ; People v. Eppinger, 105 Cal. 36, 38 Pac. 538 (1894) ; People v. Cuddihi,
54 Cal. 53 (1879) ; People v. Phipps, 39 Cal. 326 (1870) ; People v. Beatty, 14 Cal. 566 (1860).
NOTES
When one looks at the allegations in the Marshall case, which stated that Mar-
tens was robbed of an automobile, it is obvious that the information did in fact
charge a violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code. The defendant was put on
notice that he would have to defend against this crime. It follows, therefore, that
as far as informing the defendant of the offenses charged and following the rules
as to the sufficiency of pleading, the ruling in People v. Marshall is sound.
Having previously shown that the logic of the Marshall case is substantial,
this writer will now show that as a practical matter the courts use the accusatory
pleadings in determining what are necessarily included offenses.
Section 261 of the Penal Code defines the crime of rape in six subdivisions.
These subdivisions describe the six different ways in which the crime of rape can
be committed. In People v. Craig15 the court held that no matter how many sub-
divisions of section 261 of the Penal Code are violated, there can only be one con-
viction of rape resulting from a single act of intercourse. Since there is only one
crime of rape, a court, in order to determine what crimes are necessarily included
in rape, must look to the accusatory pleadings. This is illustrated in the following
cases. In People v. Greer 6 the defendant was charged with a violation of sections
261 (1), statutory rape, and 288 of the Penal Code. The defendant pleaded former
jeopardy due to a prior conviction of section 702 of the Penal Code, contributing
to the delinquency of a minor, arising out of the same act. The court held that
statutory rape could not be committed without violating section 702 and, there-
fore, section 702 was necessarily included in section 261 (1) of the Penal Code. To
try him for violating section 261 of the Penal Code would put him in double
jeopardy. In contrast, In re Hess17 held that, under an information charging "rape,
a felony, or violation of section 261(3) forcible rape," section 702 was not a neces-
sarily included offense, because it could be committed without contributing to the
delinquency of a minor.
It would be difficult to see how the courts arrived at their conclusion in these
two cases, unless they referred to the accusatory pleadings. In order for section 702
of the Penal Code to be an offense necessarily included in rape, a violation of sec-
tion 261 (1) of the Penal Code would have to be pleaded. This is because due proc-
ess requires that the defendant be put on notice of the offense he is charged with
and the definition of rape does not include the elements of section 702 of the Penal
Code, but the definition of statutory rape does. Although the defendant in the Hess
case might have committed rape on a girl under 18 years of age, the pleading of
section 261(3) of the Penal Code would not inform the defendant that he was
being charged with the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
In People v. Mendoza'8 the defendant was indicted for attempt to commit
rape. The allegation stated "that defendant did with force and violence attempt to
have and accomplish an act of sexual intercourse." The defendant pleaded once in
jeopardy due to a prior conviction of battery out of the same act. The court held
that the crime of attempt to commit rape does not necessarily include an assault
and battery, but that an analysis of the allegations contained in the information
show a battery (i.e. "with force and violence") and therefore battery was specifi-
15 17 Cal. 2d 453, 457, 110 P.2d 403, 404, 405 (1941).
16 30 Cal. 2d 589, 184 P.2d 512 (1947).
17 45 Cal. 2d 171, 288 P.2d 5 (1955).
18 55 Cal. App. 2d 625, 628, 629, 131 P.2d 622, 624, 625 (1942).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9
Nov., 19572
cally pleaded and became necessarily included in the crime charged. The court
held that the defendant was once in jeopardy.
The above cases point out the fact that, although the statutory definitions of
the crimes of rape and attempted rape do not necessarily include the lesser offenses
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and battery, respectively, the courts
will hold that they are necessarily included offenses. This is only true if the facts
alleged in the accusatory pleadings show that the specific rape charged could not
have been committed without committing the lesser offense.
The reasoning of these cases is buttressed by out of state decisions which use
the same criteria for the determination of necessarily included offenses. In Barton
v. State,19 a Georgia case, the court held that the offense of assault with intent to
commit rape does not necessarily include the offense of assault and battery, but
that an indictment for such offense may so describe the manner of its commission
as to constitute a charge of the lesser crime of assault and battery. In State v.
Wall,20 an Idaho case, the court held that "even though sodomy wasn't charged,
the acts alleged in the information were sufficient to charge sodomy." Both of these
cases, though not expressly holding what criterion is used to determine necessarily
included offenses, do use the accusatory pleading as the determining factor and
not the statutory definition.
Assault with the intent to commit murder 2' and assault with a deadly weapon22
are different offenses. 23 However, the courts of California have determined that
an assault with a deadly weapon is in certain cases an included offense in assault
with intent to commit murder.24 To do so they have had to look to the accusa-
tory pleadings. For example, in People v. Gordon25 the court held that an assault
with a deadly weapon is necessarily included in assault with intent to commit
murder when the information charges the greater offense to have been committed
with a deadly weapon. Since these two crimes by statutory definition are not neces-
sarily included offenses, it is apparent they could only become so when the accusa-
tory pleading charged them as such.
Until the Marshall case the courts have had to feel their way in trying to find
a criterion to determine when a lesser offense is necessarily included in the crime
charged. Through such groping they began a trend toward the result, culminating
in People v. Marshall.
By thus clearly defining the law, this decision is of great benefit to the court
and the accused in that both can now be assured that to determine whether or not
a particular offense is a "necessarily included offense," they will merely look to
the accusatory pleadings.
John C. Ricksen
19 58 Ga.App. 554, 199 SE. 357 (1938).
20 73 Idaho 142, 248 P.2d 222 (1952).
21 CAL. PEN. CODE § 217.
22 CAL. PEx. CODE § 245.
23 Ex pare Moore, 29 Cal. App. 2d 56, 84 P.2d 57 (1938); People v. McNeer, 14 Cal.
App. 2d 22, 57 P.2d 1018 (1936).24 People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 227, 33 Pac. 901 (1893) People v. Lightner, 49 Cal. 226,
228, 229 (1874).
25 99 Cal. 227, 33 Pac. 901 (1893).
NOTES
